Alexander Vassiliev’s Notes and Harry Dexter White

Documentation Background

For more than six decades, the question of whether Harry Dexter White, an American Keynesian economist and U.S. Department of Treasury official, was or was not a knowing source for Soviet intelligence in the 1930s and during World War II has remained one of the most debated issues in the history of Soviet espionage in America. For four decades, the sole sources of espionage allegations against White were to be found in the testimony of two famous defectors from the Soviet cause – Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley.

Chambers, an avowed former Communist, spoke about his association with White in the 1930s in interviews with the FBI and later in testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), the grand jury in the Alger Hiss case, and the two Hiss perjury trials. A few pages of notes in White’s handwriting, which were produced by Chambers in November 1948 among the cache of typewritten and handwritten papers known as the Baltimore Documents, became material evidence of White’s complicity in espionage.

Elizabeth Bentley accused White of providing information to Soviet intelligence in statements to the FBI in November 1945. Although Bentley’s accusations were hearsay (she had not met White), White was named at the top of an FBI list of government employees suspected of espionage for the Soviet Union which the FBI had been sending to the White House and a number of government agencies since November 1945. On July 31, 1948, Bentley testified publicly before HUAC that White had provided information to the Soviet Union during World War II. On August 13, 1948, White testified before HUAC and vehemently denied Bentley’s and Chambers’s accusations. Three days later, on August 16, he died of a heart attack at the age of 55.

The early Cold War accusations against White were bolstered by the release in 1995-1996 of Soviet intelligence cables which were partially decrypted in the course of the Venona operation. In a few decrypted cables from 1944 and 1945, White was identified by Venona translators as a Soviet source code-named “Jurist” and “Richard.”

Further evidence of White’s “complicity” emerged from exclusive access to KGB foreign intelligence records granted in the early 1990s to a former KGB officer and journalist named Alexander Vassiliev, who was working on a Russian-American collaborative book. Later, Vassiliev’s research became the basis for a book named The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America -The Stalin Era (1999) that he co-authored with American historian Allen Weinstein. In 1994-1995, Vassiliev was making notes (summaries or almost verbatim copies) and at the same time, writing draft chapters for a future book.

In 2005, Vassiliev teamed up with American historians John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr to produce another rewrite of the history of Soviet espionage based upon his archival treasure trove from1994-1995. This book was published in May 2009 by Yale University Press under the title SPIES: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America. Almost simultaneously, electronic copies of Vassiliev’s eight notebooks (along with their Russian transcripts and English translations) were posted on the website of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. ¹

In Vassiliev’s notes on more than two dozen World War II-period documents, Harry Dexter White appears under three pseudonyms, “Jurist,” “Richard” and “Reed.” Since Vassiliev never saw a file dedicated to White (“for unexplained reasons,” as he said ²), his notes do not provide an unequivocal answer about the nature of White’s relationship to Soviet intelligence. The record is too convoluted, ambiguous and largely circumstantial to be considered grounds for “closing the case.” However, it does shed new and important light on White’s relationship with Soviet intelligence and, rather than closing the case, puts the existing body of evidence to a serious test.

Harry Dexter White in SPIES: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (2009)

The story of Harry Dexter White, as it appears in the notes Vassiliev took on more than two dozen KGB foreign intelligence documents, got little attention from Vassiliev’s second American co-authors, historians John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr. This is particularly striking in view of the fact that a lengthy opening chapter of their book, entitled “Alger Hiss: Case Closed,” is devoted to another landmark story, that of Alger Hiss. For an impartial historian this choice of emphasis is puzzling: the story of Alger Hiss has commonly been viewed in the United States as an important part of the narrative about Soviet military intelligence, and this book is devoted to the history of KGB operations in the United States. At the same time, the story of Harry Dexter White – a key figure in the creation of the post-World War II economic order known as the Bretton Woods system – is considered part and parcel of the history of KGB operations during the World War II period. Yet while the Alger Hiss chapter takes up 32 pages in SPIES, White gets only a three-and-a-half page section in a chapter entitled “Infiltration of the U.S. Government” (pp. 258-262). There are also a few references to White cited in other chapters.

The subchapter, “Harry Dexter White,” describes White as follows:

The most important member of the Silvermaster network and the most highly placed asset the Soviets possessed in the American government was Harry Dexter White, assistant secretary of the Treasury. More than two dozen KGB documents, spanning 1941 to 1948, spell out his assistance to Soviet intelligence. …

New KGB materials fill in the gaps in the existing body of evidence regarding White’s participation in espionage…. ³

However, if a reader relies upon Haynes and Klehr’s selections from Vassiliev’s rather extensive notes on White – without comparing their book to the actual notes – he or she will get the impression that the notes simply fill in the gaps in the body of evidence that is available in the United States, rather than significantly changing our understanding of this evidence. In fact, Vassiliev’s notes markedly alter the picture.

I. Vassiliev’s Notes and Chambers’s Story about White’s Relationship with Soviet Intelligence

The SPIES authors present Vassiliev’s notes as a final corroboration of Chambers’s story about his relationship with White in the 1930s:

Whittaker Chambers stated that in the mid-1930s White had been a source for his GRU-CPUSA network. He had provided information both in oral briefings and in handwritten summaries, one of which Chambers hid in 1938 and produced in 1948, along with State Department documents provided by Alger Hiss. Chambers described White as more of a Soviet sympathizer than a disciplined CPUSA member, someone who cooperated with the party underground to the extent he wished but didn’t take orders, an attitude that occasionally irritated Chambers’s GRU superior.” ⁴

Vassiliev’s notes shed some light on White’s relationship – or, more accurately, non-relationship – with Soviet military intelligence (known as the GRU after 1941) in the 1930s.

SPIES quotes from the final report of Vassili Zarubin, the NKGB station chief or resident in the United States, on his mission from January 1942 to August 1944 – in order to corroborate Chambers’s description of White, who is mentioned under the pseudonym “Jurist.” The report was written in the fall of 1944, upon Zarubin’s return to Moscow:

In 1944, Vassili Zarubin, in the report on his tenure as New York KGB station chief, wrote: “‘Jurist’ is rough around the edges and a lot of work has to be done on him before he will make a valuable informant. To date he has reported only what he deemed necessary himself.” Earlier [Nov 1942 - notation in the margin] Moscow Center had told the KGB New York station: “According to the information we have received, ‘Jurist’ [White] at one time was a probationer [agent] of the neighbors [GRU]. We will communicate detailed information about him separately. …” ⁵

On scrutiny of Vassiliev’s notes, we can see that Haynes and Klehr’s quote from Zarubin’s September 1944 report to the People’s Commissar of State Security, Vsevolod Merkulov, omits information that is most pertinent for understanding White’s role:

5. ‘Jurist’ is Harry …, one of the leading officials at the Treasury Dept., member of no party,a man of leftist views, close friend of ‘Pal,’ ‘Polo‘ and ‘Aileron.’ The friendship dates back to 1937-1938 – the ‘Jurist’ shares information with them, knowing that they have an interest in it, but he doesn’t provide documents. The ‘Jurist’ is rough around the edges and a lot of work has to be done on him before he will make a valuable informant. To date he has reported only what he deemed necessary himself. If ‘Pal’ receives proper and sufficient guidance from us, he will be able to put the ‘Jurist’ to much more specific and broader uses. ⁶

“Pal” was Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, the head of a Communist informational group in Washington, D.C. known as the Silvermaster group; “Polo” and “Aileron” [Eleron] were members of this group, Ludwig Ullmann and George Silverman.

After quoting Moscow Center’s information about White’s past “affiliation” as of November 1942, Haynes and Klehr fail to cite further evidence in Vassiliev’s notes which contradicts – and, in fact, refutes — that initial perception. In one of the draft chapters he wrote for Weinstein in the 1990s, Vassiliev described how the same Vassili Zarubin had learned about some of White’s complicated history. (White appears there under the pseudonym “Jurist” or “Lawyer”; footnotes in the text are Vassiliev’s archival references. The text is cited in Vassiliev’s translation, made some time between 1994 and 1996 for his first American co-author, Allen Weinstein. Vassiliev’s grammar and spelling have been retained; the emphasis is added.) Vassiliev wrote:

The lack of direct connection with the source often resulted in a mess in the control of all the network. For instance, in May, 1944 the Center felt a necessity to establish a direct contact with “Lawyer.” Lubyanka had data that in 1935-40 he was a source of the military “neighbours” and was being controlled directly by their operative, and in 1940 by Browder’s instruction was included into “Pal”’s group supplying information to the NKVD. (Ibid., p. 51). The Washington and New York stations got an instruction to ask Browder and “Pal” to notify “Lawyer” that “in the nearest future he will be contacted by our man – one of official representatives whom “Lawyer” must tell everything frankly and to render any help”. (Ibid., p.48). “But on June 4, 1944, — Vassiliev continued, — Vassily Zarubin reported from Washington:

According to data, passed in his time by “Sound” [Jacob Golos - S.Ch.], “Lawyer” was not a neighbour’s agent. The case was different: “Lawyer” has a relative – doctor named either Volman or Volper, who in the past was connected with the neighbours. That doctor was allegedly getting data from “Lawyer” and passed them to neighbours. “Lawyer” knew that the doctor was a compatriot and supposed that data, provided by him, were going exactly to compatriots. Once the doctor hinted that he was working for us and would like to get “Lawyer”’s help. After this “Lawyer” turned the doctor out and prohibited him to appear in his house. Later the doctor allegedly had a kind of failure with which a certain Paul Sheffer was connected. It frightened “Lawyer” very much”. (Ibid., p.52). If this information was not got in time “our man – one of official representatives” would have found himself in a situation the doctor-relative had been in.” ⁷

Vassiliev’s draft chapters and notes shed further light on White’s past connections. Here is Vassiliev’s description of a 1945 encounter between Silvermaster (then “Robert“) and White (then “Richard”) in his manuscript, The Sources in Washington, which Vassiliev submitted in Russian to Allen Weinstein in late 1996 (here and after, excerpts from The Sources in Washington are cited in my verbatim translation):

… detailed report written by Iskhak Akhmerov on June 23, 1945…

In the same letter Akhmerov reported on the differences in the Silvermaster group, which, as it would later be ascertained, resulted from his difficult temper. To make “Richard” be more active in providing information, Silvermaster threatened that he would transfer him to the CP nuclei to which “Richard” had belonged earlier. “You may remember that one of the guys from that group tried to use blackmail to get money from “Richard” — Akhmerov wrote. – “This group has been non-existent for many years.” (Ibid., pp. 245-247) Obviously, Silvermaster was trying to pull the wool over “Richard”’s eyes.⁸

A quick check of Vassiliev’s notes produced two more references to the same episode, as follows.

First, Akhmerov returned to the same story about a long-defunct CPUSA group in his memo dated July 7, 1945:

… Some time ago I wrote to you that “Robert” threatened to send “Richard” back to the group of Communists to which “Richard” had previously belonged and which several jerks [the Russian derogatory "ubljudok" would be translated more accurately as "motherfucker"] where part of.” ⁹

And in another account of the same episode, in a mid-1945 report to Moscow from New York operatives, we can see Vassiliev’s notation in the margin identifying “one of the guys” (or “jerks”) in Akhmerov’s June 23, 1945 report as Whittaker Chambers:

… during the argument “Robert” yelled at “Richard,” and now their relationship is even more strained than before. We also learned from “Albert” that some time ago (“A” didn’t write to us about this) “Robert” demanded that “Richard” set up “Pilot” with a job in his office. “Richard” turned “Robert” down. “Robert” harshly rebuked him and threatened that if he didn’t hire “Pilot” to a job, then he, “Robert,” would transfer “Richard” to a fellowcountryman group where a traitor [marginal note from Vassiliev:  "Chambers"] who blackmailed “Richard” used to be. “Albert” was unable to clarify exactly what “Robert” meant. …. ¹⁰

In his July 7, 1945 report Akhmerov adds one more detail, which sheds further light on the nature of White’s relationship to the aforementioned 1930s CPUSA “informational group”:

Before going to prison, “Rulevoi” ["Helmsman," the pseudonym for Earl Browder used in NKGB correspondence - S.Ch.] permitted Zvuk ["Sound" - Jacob Golos] to turn to Robert for the purpose of developing our work in Washington. Soon Robert took a group consisting of Pik and Saks, later added Aileron and Richard. The latter two had been in contact with another group, doing similar work…” ¹¹

Vassiliev’s Russian Sources in Washington manuscript also sheds light on White’s relationship to the CPUSA’s so-called “informational group” in the 1930s. Reporting on a June 27, 1945 meeting with the source “Krot” ["Mole," identified by Vassiliev in a footnote for Weinstein as Charles Kramer], Vassiliev provided the following account:

On c.[comrade] Vadim’s assignment, I asked him ["Mole"] to recall the names of the individuals with whom he used to maintain contact while he was working as “Steve“’s courier [Russian "svjaznik" - S. Ch.] (in that period he had on contact the wife of “Jurist”.) This had become a difficult task for him, for it has been more than 10 years since that time. However, he recalled some of them and immediately wrote me their names on paper.

Vassiliev’s footnote No 91: “Jurist” = “Richard”. Through “Jurist”’s wife, “Mole” was connected to “Jurist” himself, although he had never met him personally on the informational work line. However, he knew him well on the official line. (Ibid., p. 78.) ¹²

“Steve” (a.k.a. “Storm“) was a CPUSA functionary who appears in party files as J. Peters, “Peter” and “Pete,” and whom Chambers described as the sinister head of the “Communist Party underground.” In Vassiliev’s draft chapters and notes, this man (whose real name was Alexander Goldberger) appears as the head of a CPUSA Washington “informational group” in the 1930s. The same episode appears in Vassiliev’s White Notebook No 1, p.95.

II. Vassiliev’s Notes and the Question of White’s Relationship with Soviet Intelligence during World War II

The SPIES book claims that the evidence of White’s espionage during World War II “is overwhelming.” ¹³ However, the authors cite only a few instances of documentary evidence, which I will examine here.

1) White’s meeting with “a Soviet operative” in July 1944 is sourced to the famous Venona cable from the KGB in New York to Moscow, dated August 4-5, 1944 (designated by Nos. 1119-1121), which described White’s encounter with a Soviet man who appears in the cable as “Kol’tsov“:

White answered a series of questions about American foreign policy, and the reports on the meeting went on to say: “As regards the techniques of further work with us Jurist [White] said that his wife was ready for any self-sacrifice; he himself did not think about his personal security, but a compromise would lead to a political scandal and the discredit of all supporters of the new course, therefore he would have to be very cautious. … Jurist has no suitable apartment for a permanent meeting place; all his friends are family people. Meetings could be held at their houses in such a way that one meeting devolved on each every 4-5 months. He proposed infrequent conversations lasting up to half an hour while driving in his automobile.” ¹⁴

However, SPIES does not tell its readers that White was meeting with a Soviet “official representative” – as the Moscow Center instructed its Washington and New York stations in May 1944. Around May 27, 1944, the Center informed its New York and Washington station chiefs that “a special operative from the Center will shortly travel” to the United States ” in order to arrange a personal meeting with “Jurist.” The cable included an instruction “to warn J.[Jurist] that very soon he will be contacted by our man from among official representatives, whom J. must tell everything candidly and assist in every possible way.” ¹⁵ The timing of the Venona August 3-4, 1944 cable implies that the elusive Kol’tsov was one of the members of the Soviet official delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference. In one of his draft chapters Vassiliev cited Zarubin’s June 4, 1944 report from Washington about the “data” certifying that White [then "Jurist"/"Lawyer"] had not been a source of the military “neighbors” in the past, and concluded:

“If this information was not got in time ‘our man – one of [Soviet - S.Ch.] official representatives’ would have found himself in a situation the doctor-relative had been in.” ¹⁶

Without consulting their Russian co-author about his reading of Zarubin’s report, Haynes and Klehr described the encounter as a “covert KGB contact” between “a Soviet operative” and White. ¹⁷

SPIES does not provide any background on the White-”Kol’tsov” meeting. However, its timing and White’s mention of a “new course” speak for themselves. The famous meeting took place immediately after the Bretton Woods Conference (officially known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference), which had made historic decisions on how to establish a “new world order” by creating a post-war global financial system that would include the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

According to one eyewitness account, at the time of the meeting in question White had just come off a three-week, 700- delegate conference during which he had had only two to four hours of sleep per night, and was clearly running on adrenaline. His only focus, as the economist who had spent years developing the ideas and the scenario behind what would come to be known as the Bretton Woods system, was on getting the recalcitrant Russians to buy into the IMF idea. The Bretton Woods Conference was the result of decades of “dreaming & planning” that began when White, still a rather junior Treasury official, met with the British economist John Maynard Keynes in 1935. They began negotiating the structure of the future IMF as early as 1943. ¹⁸

Understanding this background from Bretton Woods-period records in U.S. Treasury Department files, and knowing of the Soviet reluctance to jump on the Bretton Woods bandwagon from reading Soviet records of the period, it is clear that White saw his role, in his meeting with “Kol’tsov,” as that of a salesman who is pursuing a big deal – and is ready to jump through fiery hoops to close it.

White’s interlocutor, hidden behind the pseudonym “Kol’tsov,” was obviously one of the Soviet participants in the Bretton Woods Conference. The identification of Kol’tsov as Nickolai Fedorovich Chechulin, then deputy chairman of the Soviet State Bank,  first made several years ago by American historian Bruce Craig ¹⁹ has now been considerably strengthened by Vassiliev’s description of the man as “one of the official representatives” in one the draft chapters he prepared for his first American co-author, Allen Weinstein.

In SPIES (as well as in their earlier writing), Haynes and Klehr apparently had trouble understanding the meaning of the “new course” wording in the Venona cable. The difficulty probably went back to the Venona translators – or even to the Soviets’ original translation of White’s wording. “New course” in Russian would be “Novyi kurs” [Новый курс] – exactly the same words Russians use to translate Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal.” At the time of the conversation, White would probably not have thought up a catchy marketing term (like “New Deal” 12 years earlier) for this new global financial system idea.

That was exactly how Venona translators explained the “new course” wording in their footnote to the August 4-5 cable:

[c] NOVYJ KURS in the Russian. If correct it might be a way of translating “New Deal”

Compare it to the interpretation, which Haynes and Klehr provided in a footnote to their discussion of “Kol’tsov” cable (emphasis added):

[118] “Maxim on Mer’s first conversation with Pal.” circa mid 1944, KGB file
35112, v4, p148, Vassiliev, White #3, 16. Venona 1119-1121 KGB New York to
Moscow, 4-5 August 1944. The “new course” referred to a policy of American ac-
commodation of Soviet foreign policy goals. Venona 1388-1389 KGB New York to
Moscow, 1 October 1944.

2) The second piece of “overwhelming evidence” of White’s espionage cited in SPIES relates to White’s meetings, during the United Nations founding conference in San Francisco and afterwards, with “KGB officer Vladimir Pravdin,” who attended the conference in his capacity as New York chief of the Soviet news agency, TASS.

Indeed, in Vassiliev’s notes on Moscow Center’s June 1, 1945 instructions to “Sergei” [Pravdin], “Richard” is listed among “agent capabilities” for “cultivation of Truman’s inner circle.” ²⁰

Vassiliev cited an untitled and undated report about the meeting between White [by that time designated as "Reed"] and “Sergei” on August 8, 1945, when White is reported to have told “Sergei” that “Pilot” (the pseudonym of Silvermaster’s associate, Ludwig Ullmann) had asked him for help in returning to the Treasury to replace “Zhenya” (the pseudonym of an economist at the Monetary Research department at the Treasury, Sonia Gold) in “our”, that is, Soviet, work. Meanwhile, the new Secretary of the Treasury was not sharing important information with White. ²¹

Following Moscow’s instructions, “Reed was told that we have an interest in his keeping his current position, in which he can work most fruitfully in the interests of our cause. When he asked whether this instruction was in line with the wishes of the Home’s leadership [the writer of the report was clearly referring to his home country, the Soviet Union], he was answered in the affirmative, and Reed was evidently flattered by the clarification that on such important matters as his work we always consult the center and ask for special instructions.” ²²

However damning the reports on White’s meetings with Pravdin ["Sergei"] may look in Vassiliev’s notes, they correlate poorly with Vassiliev’s notes on other documents that relate to White. Besides, too often it is difficult to differentiate between what White might actually have said and the presentation given by a Soviet intelligence officer.

Knowing how much White wanted the Soviets to join the Bretton Woods system (a rather thin hope, given the odds – and given our hindsight knowledge that the Soviets refused to join the Bretton Woods system in December 1945), the reports on White’s meetings with Pravdin may still be read as though White was going out of his way to accommodate the Soviets. Such a reading is circumstantially confirmed in an almost simultaneous report on a meeting between “Sergei” [the same Pravdin who met with White in San Francisco] and “Robert” [Silvermaster]:

According to R. [Robert], the most difficult aspect of his work is the fact that, except for Pilot, none of the other probationers wants to work. …
… The situation with Reed [White], according to Robert, is different. The reason that Reed doesn’t pass along information or documents is not that he doesn’t want to help us, but partly because he is extremely absent-minded and forgets his promises, but mainly because he considers such work secondary. According to Robert, Reed feels that his main calling is to provide advice on fundamental political and econom. issues. ²³

Ray Mikesell, an American economist who became an adviser to White toward the end of the war, was present at the Bretton Woods Conference. (Among other things, he provided White with data to use in resisting John Maynard Keynes’ attempts to preserve British interests.) In his 2000 book, Foreign Adventures of an Economist, Mikesell wrote:

Many people have asked me if White was a Communist. I am convinced that he was not. White believed in free markets and capitalism and devoted his energies to planning for a postwar world with free and nondiscriminatory trade and payments. He was, however, quite willing to deal with Communist officials to achieve his objectives. The Soviet Union shared his political objectives regarding postwar Germany, and he believed that Soviet officials would support the Fund and the Bank proposals. He did not share the pervasive fear that the Communist ideology would spread to the rest of the world, or that the Soviet Union might dominate the world by military conquest. He believed that a Communist state could operate under a system of nondiscriminatory trade rules, abiding by the trade and exchange obligations of his plan. ²⁴

This belief would soon be shattered by the Soviet decision to withdraw from the Bretton Woods system.

3) The most confusing evidence about Harry Dexter White in Vassiliev’s notes is not included in the SPIES book at all. Ten years ago, it was also left out of the book written by Vassiliev’s first American co-author, Allen Weinstein. With a few exceptions, most “White” documents in Vassiliev’s notebooks were cited and discussed only in the draft chapters which Vassiliev himself wrote for Weinstein between 1994 and 1996.

For example, in his Sources in Washington manuscript, Vassiliev cited the reports of the Soviet “illegal” resident in the United States, Iskhak Akhmerov, about his encounter with Nathan Gregory Silvermaster; the subject was $2,000 given in 1944 to help White with the education of his daughter. A late 1944 Venona cable about this $2,000 has been cited as damning evidence of White’s espionage. ²⁵ Here is how this cable is summarized in Haynes and Klehr’s 1999 book:

In November 1944 the KGB told Moscow that Silvermaster had spoken with Terry Ann White, Harry’s wife. She told him that her husband was considering a position in private business in order to finance college education for one of their daughters. Silvermaster, according to a Venona decryption, responded that the KGB “would willingly have helped them and that in view of all the circumstances would not allow them to leave Carthage [Washington]. Robert [Silvermaster] thinks that Richard [Harry White] would have refused a regular payment but might accept gifts as a mark of our gratitude for [unrecovered code groups] daughter’s expenses which may come up to two thousand a year. Albert [Akhmerov] said to Robert that in his opinion we would agree to provide for Richard’s daughter’s education.” ²⁶ The New York KGB endorsed Akhmerov’s offer to finance the college education of Akhmerov’s daughter and asked for Moscow’s sanction. (Moscow’s reaction, however, is not among the Venona messages decrypted.) ²⁷

Vassiliev’s notes make it clear that Moscow did send the $2,000 under discussion. However, Haynes and Klehr have chosen to keep silent about the sequel to the episode, which they cited in their 1999 book as one of the “particular examples of White’s espionage.” ²⁸ Here is what the Soviet “illegal” Akhmerov reported to Moscow about his November 10, 1945 meeting with Silvermaster:

… A while ago, I have written to you [about] the 2 thousand dollars you had sent as a gift to “Richard” to pay expenses associated with his daughter’s education. Although it was “Robert” who had initially proposed the idea of such a gift for “Richard”, the former was reluctant to give the money to “Richard” for fear that he would not take it. I reminded ‘”Robert” on several occasions to tell ‘Richard’ about our decision to make him this gift. However, “Robert” has still not done it. This time around, I gave “Robert” this 2,000 dollars as well and told him to give them over to “Richard” – 500 as our anniversary gift (in view of the anniversary of the Oct.[October] Revolution) and 1,5 thousand to pay expenses associated with his daughter’s education.’

Last time, you sent me 1,5 thousand dollars as gifts for “Robert”, “Pilot” and “Richard”. I gave this money to “Robert” as a gift for himself, “Pilot”, and “Dora” – 500 dollars for each of them. The 2,000 dollars I gave “Robert” for “Richard” – is the same money you sent very long ago. ²⁹

Vassiliev’s notes on an October 3, 1945 meeting between Akhmerov and another member of the Silvermaster group indicate that White (then “Reed”) “essentially broke off” his “organizational-business connection with Robert almost half a year ago…” ³⁰ In plain language, this means that since about April 1945, White (and a few others in Silvermaster’s “informational group” mentioned in the report on that meeting – S.Ch.) had ceased to be information sources for Silvermaster (“Robert”).

4) Vassiliev’s notes chronicle White’s reluctance to cooperate with Silvermaster – and the latter’s persistent attempts to use White as a “blind” source. Here are just a few examples.

In an early 1942 report to Moscow from Vassili Zarubin ["Maxim"], White [then "Jurist"] was described in the following way:

…”Jurist” is a very nervous and cowardly person and is not getting very close to “Pal” politically. He is more interested in matters of domestic policy and his job… ³¹

The same trend was reported in early February 1943:

“Re “Jurist.” – “Sound” reports that in recent months he has begun to visit “Pal” [Silvermaster's pseudonym until September 1944] less often, obviously out of fear for his career, and has almost completely forgotten about his leftist attitudes in the past. According to “Sound,” “Pal” says that there are no opportunities to approach “Jurist.” ³²

On August 19, 1945, Iskhak Akhmerov wrote:

He states that “Richard” would have died of heart rupture if he had known how many documentary materials we have obtained from that agency [the U.S. Treasury]; that even one thousand’s share of these documents did not come from “Richard”. For many years he ["Robert"] was trying to make him ["Richard"] give us regular documentary information, however, it was always a pure luck to obtain anything from him. It happens very seldom when he gives “Robert” a little [portion of] materials to look through. “Robert” has long abandoned an idea to turn him into a systematic source for obtaining documentary information. “Richard”, as well as “Pik” were of use to us mostly for arranging hiring of our workers to important positions with a regular flow of materials. He stated: “You have all long tried to work with “Richard” and “Eleron”, however you have not gone too far.” ³³

5) Finally, there is the question of how the NKGB operatives themselves evaluated White’s relationship with their service.

The earliest appearance by Harry Dexter White in Vassiliev’s notes is dated October 2, 1941, when “Pal” passed along a report entitled, “The Food Situation in Continental Europe” – written “on 30 August 1941 by H.D. White, chief of the division of monetary research at the Department of the Treasury…” ³⁴

On November 3, 1941, “Pal” reported “on Gromyko’s negotiations with White, ” who was wrongly described as an official “of the Commerce Department.” In that report, “Pal” was definitely passing on to “Sound” (whom he knew as an American) the information he had gleaned from social conversations with his contacts. ³⁵

By late November 1941, White was assigned the pseudonym “Jurist,” under which he would appear in NKGB operational correspondence until September 2, 1944. “Jurist” appears in the earliest dated record cited in the SPIES book – a November 27, 1941 cable which, according to Vassiliev’s notes, Moscow Center sent to New York in care of Vassili Zarubin. In terms of chronology, the cable’s dating is absurd, since Zarubin is on record as arriving in New York City only in early 1942. The SPIES authors explain the disconnect by stating that “Zarubin was then in transit,” — but sending instructions to a resident by cipher cable more than a month before his arrival seems illogical.

Here is what the cable’s instructions say about White (then “Jurist”):

“Jurist” represents the most valuable source from this group. His capabilities, thanks to his proximity to Morgenthau, are very substantial. We should focus our work with him on obtaining important documented and verbal information. In this regard it is essential to train the source to transmit exactly what he has heard and to extract from his interaction from Morgenthau’s inner circle information that is of most interest to us. Simultaneously study and cultivate both Morgenthau’s connections and his own. ³⁶

On January 10, 1942, Moscow sent a lengthy cable to its recently arrived US resident. Among other assignments, it directed “Pal” (Silvermaster) to “continue to work with ‘Jurist’ on his further development in order to prepare the ‘Jurist’’s transfer to direct communications with our operative.” ³⁷

The discussions of White by New York operatives and their Moscow supervisors remind me of the game of “telephone,” known in Russia as “spoiled telephone.” Until his death on November 23, 1943, Jacob Golos ["Sound"] had remained the Soviet operatives’ only link to the Silvermaster group – and the only source of information about its members. Here is how White appeared in “Sound”’s late March 1942 report on his meeting with Nathan Gregory Silvermaster:

Two weeks ago, after dinner on Sunday, the head of his division – White – a rather respectable liberal, who strongly opposes the indiscriminate vilification of the “Reds” that is currently taking place in every government department and feels that such a policy is unjust in the highest degree called Greg and told him that he wanted to see him…. ³⁸

According to Vassiliev’s notes, White’s name was inserted in English cursive into the typed Russian text – the practice for writing names which had not appeared in earlier communications.

Just a few days later, on April 6, 1942, an “orientation on ‘Political and Diplomatic Lines of Work’” in the United States was compiled in Moscow. Vasssiliev’s notes on this document are very fragmented. Here is what they say about the status of White, or “Jurist”:

The Ministry of Finance. The group of “Pal” (agent) which includes “Jurist”, “Saks”, “Pik” and “Polo.” Used blind. ³⁹

In intelligence tradecraft, “blind” means using someone without his/her knowledge. Here is what this document says about “Jurist” and other “blind” sources (quoted from a Xerox copy of this document in my possession):

… The group of “Pal” which includes “Jurist”, “Saks,” “Pik” and “Polo” is at present the most efficient among the agent network we possess. However, at present only “Pal” is our agent, all the rest are used by us blind. ⁴⁰

However, with respect to White, “blind” was a stretch, as is evident from Zarubin’s report to Moscow on August 18, 1942:

A total misunderstanding has occurred with “Jurist” [White's pseudonym until September 1944]: you consider him a “valuable probationer” (obviously based on what was reported to you or, rather, was not reported) and here “Leonid” informed us along the same lines. However, when we too had the idea of separating “Jurist” from “Pal’s” group and taking him over for direct communications, it turned out that he is not only not our probationer, but we hardly know anything about him at all, and “Sound” also knows very little about him and has a very fuzzy concept of the nature of his contact with “Pal’s” group. ⁴¹

Still, in late November, 1942, Moscow Center instructed Zarubin:

… “Jurist” … should, at last, be properly recruited for work and taken on for direct communications. In view of “Jurist’s” value and the necessity of adhering to the rules of covert work, we consider it advisable to assign a special illegal to work with him. … ⁴²

The Center’s instructions betrayed its lack of understanding of the real situation. Until the very end, the Soviets would be unable to involve White in direct communication. His conversations with Pravdin in San Francisco, however revealing, still fall far short of this goal.

On September 2, 1944, White’s pseudonym was changed from “Jurist” to “Richard”. ⁴³

By early January 1945, the Center was still urging its New York operatives to “achieve full utilization of the capabilities” of White, or “Richard,” who is described as one of “Robert’s” “probationers and connections.” ⁴⁴

In July 1945 New York operatives reported to the Center that, according to Silvermaster’s account to Akhmerov, “Richard” was not providing any information at all, because of a poor relationship with Silvermaster. ⁴⁵

However, by that time, according to Vassiliev’s notes, White was meeting with the New York “legal” resident, Vladimir Pravdin (“Sergei”) – continuing the pattern of their meetings at the San Francisco conference. Vassiliev’s notes do not indicate whether White was conscious that he was talking to a representative of Soviet intelligence – or whether he perceived his interlocutor, the New York bureau chief for TASS, as an authorized representative of the Soviet Union. Pravdin’s European appearance and manners and his fluent English obviously added to the confusion; his real name was Rolland Abbiate, and he was the English-born son of a native of Monaco who spent most of his adult life in the West. What we see in Vassiliev’s notes is the specific language of intelligence reporting, which may be miles away from the actual language spoken by Pravdin and White. In Vassiliev’s notes, it looks as though this final attempt by Soviet intelligence to cultivate White as its asset began with the Center’s June 1, 1945 instructions to “Sergei” [Pravdin] about the importance of “the cultivation of Truman’s inner circle .” Apparently, White was mentioned among the station’s “agent capabilities” (although some of these “agent capabilities” had yet to be recruited. ⁴⁶

After July 20, 1945, White appears under the pseudonym “Reed.” ⁴⁷ It seems that this third pseudonym under which White appeared in Vassiliev’s notes was assigned specifically for communications about Pravdin’s cultivation of White, since in Akhmerov’s communications White continued to appear as “Richard.” According to Vassiliev’s notes, in July and August 1945 there were “several meetings” between “Reed” and New York resident “Sergei” – mostly discussing White’s employment prospects.

According to Vassiliev’s summary, on July 20, 1945 “Sergei had a meeting with Reed at which the latter said that they barely talked. A cipher cable was sent to C.[Moscow Center] about this.” ⁴⁸ It follows, from Vassiliev’s indication of the pagination in the “source” archival file that this summary referred to archival page 64.

Vassiliev’s next two brief summaries referred to archival page 81. The first is a brief comment that “there were several meetings with Reed.” This is directly followed by another comment Vassiliev made on his reading of the same page:

[Robert assumed Albert was a US citizen, which the station was not aware of. Sergei suggested to A. that he come clean, but the latter said that Robert would blab to the other members of the group.] ⁴⁹

“Robert,” as we know, was Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, the leader of the informational group the Soviets had been using as a source since at least 1941. “Albert” was the “illegal” resident Iskhak Akhmerov, who had been the case officer for that group since 1944. From Vassiliev’s brief summaries of this most relevant part of the archival file, we cannot say if this situation was discussed in connection with the cultivation of White. However, this passage is vital for understanding the relationship between the members of the group Silvermaster headed and Soviet intelligence. Vassiliev states unequivocally that, as of late July 1945, Silvermaster was not aware that he was dealing with a Soviet national. Similarly, none of Silvermaster’s sources were aware of this situation. Moreover, from Vassiliev’s brief summary it looks as though Akhmerov prevailed in his opinion that the situation should not be changed and that Silvermaster and his sources should remain in the dark. This state of affairs should definitely be kept in mind as background for White’s meetings with Pravdin.

After Vassiliev’s two brief summaries on his reading of file page 81, there is a gap of eight pages in his notes. His next brief summary refers to file page 90:

[On 8.8.45 Sergey met with Reed. The latter said that Pilot had filed his discharge papers with the Arsenal and asked Reed to process his return to "Lieutenant's" institution.] ⁵⁰

In plain language, this means that Pravdin and White were discussing the request of “Pilot” (then the pseudonym for Silvermaster group member Ludwig Ullman) for help getting a job at the Department of the Treasury. As we have already seen, the same situation had been discussed by Silvermaster and Akhmerov in July. At that time, Akhmerov reported that Silvermaster “yelled” at White, who refused to help set Ullman up with a job at the Treasury, and threatened to transfer White to an old – and long defunct – Communist informational group where a traitor “used to blackmail” him. In August, Pravdin was probably making another attempt to ask White to help Ullmann.

There are no more notes on file page 90, and no notes at all on file page 91. The next note – on file page 92 – looks like a continuation of the discussion at the same August 8, 1945 meeting:

[A regular meeting with Reed in Carthage [Washington, D.C.] on 8.8.45.]

[He said that "Lieutenant" was treating him well, in familiar terms, but wasn't sharing important information so far, as "Nabob" (the pseudonym for former Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau - SCh) did.] ⁵¹

What this means, in plain language, is that White was telling his interlocutor that, with the change of guard at the Treasury Department, he, White, no longer enjoyed access to “important information.”

The next in Vassiliev’s excerpted quotes from “Sergei”’s reports on his meetings with White, describing their meeting on August 8, 1945, was already cited above in another context. According to Vassiliev’s pagination, it came from archival page 93.

The report on the August 8 meeting is followed by a brief note on meetings between Pravdin and White, referred to on file page 99, and was probably made by Vassiliev to convey the nature of the relationship between the two men:

[Reed gave Sergey two books by his wife on 13.8.45 for publication in the USSR.]
“It was hard to refuse Reed this favor, but we doubt that these books could be of interest to our publishing houses.” ⁵²

However, at the time there was a third heavy-weight player in the field – the NKGB resident in Washington, D.C., Anatoly Gorsky (“Vadim“), who is sometimes referred to as the NKGB “chief resident” in the United States. From December 1944 on, White appeared as “Richard” in “Vadim”’s reports on his cultivation of another Treasury official, Harold Glasser (“Ruble“). To complicate matters, in his official (or “cover”) capacity as the First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. (under the alias of Anatoly Gromov), “Vadim” was used by the Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko as a contact with White. In “Vadim”’s December 12, 1944 report to Moscow Center, his contacts with White look like a casual affair:

12.12.44 “Vadim” reported from Washington:

On December 9th of this year, Gromyko instructed me to meet with “Richard” with the aim of receiving additional information from Morgenthau’s department regarding the German postage stamps they prepared.

On the same day, I got a phone call from “Richard,” who asked me to stop by to see him in order to receive the info. that Gromyko wanted.

I went to Morgenthau’s department on December 11th. “Richard” was not there, but one of his secretaries took me to his assistant, on whose door was written: Assistant of the Direction of the Division of Monetory Research. This assistant of “Richard”s’ turned out to be “Ruble”. …” ⁵³

“Richard” repeatedly appeared in “Vadim”’s correspondence in “Ruble”’s file, however only as “Ruble”’s “direct superior.” ⁵⁴

Still, according to Vassiliev’s notes, in “Vadim”’s early August report White appeared under his own name – and in a context which suggests the NKGB chief resident’s ignorance of the nuances of White’s relationship with Soviet intelligence:

On 2.8.45, Vadim reports that Bernstein (‘Bernie’), who used to work at the Dept. of the Treasury, is the head of the financial division of the Amer. group of inter-allied control commission in G.[Germany] He is under the patronage of Harry White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and the main author of the USA’s proposals at Bretton Woods, as well as the leader of a group of Treasury Dept. officials who are trying get anti-Fascist policies adopted in G. Virtually the entire group is notable for its extreme opportunism. Nevertheless, for a number of years they tried to exert a liberal influence on the gov’t. ….” ⁵⁵

There is an obvious disconnect between the appearance of White in “Vadim”’s reports and in “Sergei”’s reports on his meetings with “Reed” [White], which I cannot explain simply by the fact that operations were compartmentalized.

Furthermore, there is an obvious disconnect in the intelligence information reports the NKGB sent at the time to the Soviet top leaders – Stalin, Molotov and Beria.

Here is how White appeared in a “summary report” by “Homer” (the British agent Donald Maclean, then posted at the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. Vassiliev’s S, M, B and “H” in the address line of the report stand for Stalin, Molotov, Beria and “Homer”):

28.07.45-To S, M, B Summary report by H. No. 4754 dated 8.7.45. In Wash. from “H”
” …
Cabinet changes
According to a report received from a highly reliable source, Morgenthau’s resignation was caused mainly by his poor relationship with Byrnes. [The newly appointed Secretary of State. - S.Ch.] …
… M.’s shift may signal the resignation or decrease in influence of Dr. Harry White, the most important Amer. participant in the creation of the program for the Bretton Woods conference. (White is M.’s assistant. NKGB note.) The program itself is already fairly well developed, and whatever happens to this not overly sociable official will not affect it.” ⁵⁶

In an NKGB report sent to the Stalin, Molotov and Beria trio just a month later, White (as “Richard”) was indicated as a source of information:

29.08.45 To S, M, B from NY re loans (data from “Richard”)

“In the view of one responsible official at the US Dept. of the Treasury, the USSR shouldn’t
count on receiving a lump-sum loan of 6 billion dollars. At best the USSR will be able to get a loan of 1 billion dollars from the Export-Import Bank. The US govt. would like the USSR to agree to the offer formulated at the press conf. on 21.8.45 by Crowley, the head of the Foreign Economic Administration, to grant the S.U. a loan to buy the supplies it has already ordered under Lend Lease, which will not be delivered to the USSR as a result of the latest decision by the Amer. govt. A substantial portion of these orders consist of food. The Amer. govt., of course, will attempt to make the USSR buy this food if the S.U. agrees to Crowley’s offer. If the USSR refuses the food and demands capital equipment instead, the Amer. govt. apparently will give in. After the International Bank is established, the USSR may get another 1 billion-dollar loan in roughly a year or two.

The dominant opinion in the US govt. at present is Harriman’s view that the USSR should not be given a large lump-sum loan, but shipments of goods to the USSR should be stretched out over many years and loans used as a means of pressure in order to obtain polit. Concessions from the USSR. Even if the USSR managed to obtain a large lump-sum loan, there is no possibility of using it in the US in a short time because it doesn’t have the amount of goods that the USSR needs.” ⁵⁷

By all appearances, the late August report was “Vadim”’s summary of information, which he obtained in his official capacity as the Soviet Embassy’s official.

Watch for alerts on this website to see the context in which the NKGB’s August 29, 1945 report appears in Russian diplomatic and US Treasury files

Meanwhile, according to Vassiliev’s notes, Pravdin’s sporadic meetings with White continued. The next note about Pravdin ["Sergei"] meeting with White ["Reed"] is dated October 29, 1945. This time, Vassiliev’s rather lengthy notes appear to be verbatim quotes from archival file pages 142 and 143, describing a discussion of White’s employment problems and prospects, as well as Pravdin’s comments on White’s decision to quit his job at the Department of the Treasury. One passage in the discussion seems particularly telling:

It was pointed out to Reed how important it was to us to keep his post and so forth. Reed replied, however, that we wouldn’t lose anything from his departure, since Peak would replace him perfectly well. Besides, according to Reed, if he succeeded in establishing the planned office in Carthage, he would not only retain his capabilities for informing us, but would even be able to expand his connections. ⁵⁸

In plain language, this means that White discussed with Pravdin, whom he most probably perceived as a Soviet representative, that “Pik” ["Peak"] (a pseudonym for Virginius Frank Coe, who was to succeed White as director of monetary research at the Treasury Department) would be a perfect substitute as the Soviets’ contact man at the Treasury. Given the limits of Vasiliev’s notes, we are left to guess whether White was suggesting anything more than engaging the Soviets in close cooperation to realize his ideas of a post-war world economic order – what he had referred to as a “new course” in his Bretton Woods-era discussion “with one of the Soviet official representatives”.) ⁵⁹

There are no more notes on White’s meetings with Pravdin in Vassiliev’s notebooks.

On November 23, 1945, Moscow instructed its operatives in the United States about Elizabeth Bentley’s betrayal. It instructed “Sergei” [Pravdin] to do the following:

1. Inform Albert about M.[Mirna=Elizabeth Bentley] treachery.

2. Through Albert – to Robert. Warn that nobody should know about it.

3. To “Robert” and “Pilot” to seize any agent usage of their sources, and cut social meetings with their contacts: Eleron, Richard, Zhenya, Zholud’, Saks, Pik and others. ⁶⁰

Because Vassiliev’s notes on Pravdin’s interactions with White are so fragmentary, they do not lead to any unequivocal conclusion on the true nature of these meetings. Moreover, it is highly probable that there was a disconnect between White’s perception of the meetings and Pravdin’s reporting about them. On the surface, the meetings look like Soviet intelligence’s confidential contacts with a high government official, in which each side has its own understanding of the purpose and meaning of the exchange. For a deeper understanding of White’s interactions with the Soviets during World War II, it is necessary to analyze his appearances in Soviet diplomatic and Communist Party files of the period.

Watch for alerts on this website to learn how White appears in publicly accessible Soviet files.